Constitutional Law - Freedom of Religion - Judicial Intervention in Disputes Within Independent Church Bodies by Poppinga, Julius B., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 1 
1955 
Constitutional Law - Freedom of Religion - Judicial Intervention in 
Disputes Within Independent Church Bodies 
Julius B. Poppinga S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, First Amendment Commons, 
Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Julius B. Poppinga S.Ed., Constitutional Law - Freedom of Religion - Judicial Intervention in Disputes 
Within Independent Church Bodies, 54 MICH. L. REV. 102 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/4 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
102 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
COMMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF RELIGION - JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION IN DISPUTES WITHIN INDEPENDENT CHURCH BODIES 
-In his letter to the early Christian church at Corinth, the 
Apostle Paul instructed the brethren to avoid going to law against 
each other and in~tead to settle their differences among them-
selves.1 But the number of church controversies culminating in 
court action indicates that church societies have not succeeded 
in complying with this apostolic admonition. The problem of 
settling with finality a schismatic dispute is especially severe in 
autonomous, self-governing congregations.2 Recognizing no higher 
ecclesiastical authority, the aggrieved faction resorts to the only 
available tribunal-the civil court. The divergence of judicial 
reaction to such disputes is high-lighted by two recent cases arising 
concurrently in separate jurisdictions. In Illinois the appellate 
court upheld the power of an independent congregation to change 
its national affiliation while the North Carolina Supreme Court 
denied the propriety of similar action by the majority of a local 
church.3 It is the purpose of this comment to set forth the several 
principles applied by courts in determining controversies in inde-
pendent church groups and to consider the constitutional impli-
cations of judicial intervention. 
I. Property Rights Must Be Affected 
American courts consistently decline jurisdiction over ecclesias-
tical matters where property rights are not involved.4 Accordingly, 
the revocation of the privilege of participating in Communion has 
been held not subject to court review.5 And whether a complaint 
alleging wrongful dismissal from church membership will be 
heard may depend entirely upon the court's finding as to whether 
or not property rights are affected. 6 However, this initial juris-
1 I Corinthians 6:1-6. 
2 Religious organizations may be divided into three general categories as to their form 
of government: (I) monarchical, authority being centralized in the spiritual leader; (2) 
associated, with authority vested in a governing body such as an assembly; (3) independ-
ent or congregational, the local assembly retaining all control. TORPEY, JumcIAL Doc-
TRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 121 (1948); 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE 
UNITEO STATES 376 (1950). The discussion in this comment is limited to the third type. 
3 Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. (2d) 514, 123 N.E. (2d) 104 (1954) and Reid v. John-
ston, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E. (2d) 114 (1954). Both cases are discussed in detail below. 
4 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 386 (1950). 
5 Carter v. Papineau, 222 Mass. 464, Ill N.E. 358 (1916). 
6 In Clapp v. Krug, 232 Ky. 303, 22 S.W. (2d) 1025 (1929), expulsion proceedings were 
1955] COMMENTS 103 
dictional requirement is invariably met in suits between contend-
ing groups within an independent congregation. When the dis-
pute reaches the litigation stage, the issue before the court is 
which faction is entitled to the use and possession of the church 
premises. 
II. The Principle of Majority Rule 
In the leading case of Watson v. Jones,7 there is extensive dic-
tum8 to the effect that absent an express trust, or unless some 
other principle of government has been adopted, independent 
congregations are controlled by a numerical majority, the action of 
which is not subject to judicial scrutiny. It is not difficult to find 
cases which, on their facts, support this proposition. For example, 
the Mississippi court dismissed a petition for an injunction which 
would have allowed a dismissed pastor and those loyal to him 
the use of the premises from which they had been excluded.0 On 
behalf of the pastor it was alleged that the action of the controlling 
faction in expelling him and his adherents because he "went 
Fundamentalist" was unauthorized in that customary procedure 
was not followed. However, the court observed that in the matter 
giving rise to the dispute the action of the majority was supreme. 
The affair was termed "ecclesiastical and not one for the civil 
courts."10 
Similarly, a dissident faction claiming to be the "true doc-
trinaires" of the Primitive Baptist Faith was denied restoration of 
church property.11 Relief was sought on the ground that the 
church departed from its fundamental practices in expelling some 
members and admitting others while the congregation was "in 
confusion." The court disclaimed jurisdiction, saying, "In the 
instant case the church, through it congregation, was the final 
arbiter .... "12 
But courts do not always follow the hands-off policy in defer-
reviewed and set aside as to a salaried church clerk, but the court refused to consider the 
question as to other members on the ground that no civil rights had been infringed. But 
for expressions to the effect that church membership alone does involve justiciable rights, 
see 20 A.L.R. (2d) 421 at 454 (1951). 
713 Wall. (80 U.S.) 679 (1871). 
s The Supreme Court held in this case that the decision of the General Assembly of 
the Presbyterian Church U.S.A., constituting the church's highest judicatory, was not 
subject to judicial review. 
o Grantham v. Humphries, 185 Miss. 496, 188 S. 313 (1939). 
10 Id. at 499. 
11 Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 42 S. (2d) 617 (1949). 
12 Id. at 675. 
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ence to majority rule. Although the facts of individual cases multi-
ply the variations, three separate grounds for court intervention 
are reflected in recent decisions. 
III. Grounds for Judicial Intervention 
A. Enforcement of a Trust. Probably the least reluctance to 
intervene in church disputes is shown by courts when the property 
affected is held subject to an express trust.13 The right to posses-
sion in such cases will be awarded to the group acting in harmony 
with the declared trust terms.14 The operation of this principle is 
illustrated in a recent Kentucky decision15 involving a conveyance 
to the "trustees of the Church of Christ," with the deed further 
specifying that the property was to be used "for the benefit of the 
Church of Christ and ... not for any other purpose." The court 
granted an injunction preventing a faction within the congrega-
tion from using the premises as a "Christian Church." In express 
trust cases it is immaterial that the group objecting to the diver-
sion constitutes only a small minority.16 
But the application of trust principles is not limited to instances 
where a specific trust intent has been declared. By invoking a doc-
trine of implied trusts, courts will intervene to prevent practices 
found to be inimical to the purposes stated in the articles of in-
corporation or implied by the adoption of a denominational name. 
Accordingly, property acquired by a society incorporated as an 
Evangelical Lutheran church was said to be impressed with a trust 
for the advancement of that denomination, so that inviting to the 
pulpit ministers of the Mission Friends church was an enjoinable 
diversion.17 
Where the contending factions represent separate and well-
recognized denominations, the implied trust theory achieves what 
appear to be satisfactory results. However, not every case is that 
13 As to what will suffice as an expression of charitable trust intent see 2 BOGERT, 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §324 (1935). 
14 ZoLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAw 254 (1933). 
15 Luttrell v. Potts, (Ky. 1953) 257 S.W. (2d) 542. 
16 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 1239-1240 (1935). In Ward v. Crisp, 25 Beeler (189 
Tenn.) 513, 226 S.W. (2d) 273 (1949), a minority of three prevented a majority group of 
sixty members from aligning the church with a general assembly of the denomination in 
violation of a provision in the original deed of conveyance. 
17 Lindstrom v. Tell, 131 Minn. 203, 154 N.W. 969 (1915). But see Shaeffer v. Klee, 
100 Md. 264, 59 A. 850 (1905), where the court refused to halt a plan to discontinue using 
the German language in church services (a practice provided for in the articles of incor-
poration), rejecting the argument that such a change violated a "trust" reposed in the 
church trustees. 
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clear. If the theory were carried to its logical conclusion, any doc-
trinal emphasis alleged to constitute a departure from the tenets 
accepted by the organizers could conceivably be made the basis 
for judicial intervention.18 In such cases the position of the original 
congregation19 concerning the matter in dispute is often a matter 
of conjecture. The need for a judicial determination of what the 
implied trust terms are, in addition to an inquiry as to whether 
there has been a diversion, compounds the degree of court inter-
vention and constitutes an undesirable feature of this approach.20 
B. Prevention of Innovations in Accepted Doctrines, Usages, 
and Customs. Apart from any trust concepts, congregational action 
has been set aside upon a finding that changes in doctrines, cus-
toms, or usages constituted a departure from what was accepted 
before the dispute began. In a North Carolina decision21 the 
.result is vividly illustrated. Involved was a Baptist church which 
the court conceded to be independent from any external authority 
and congregationally controlled. By a vote of a substantial ma-
jority of the members present, a resolution favoring the severance 
of the church's affiliation with the Southern Baptist Convention 
was adopted. In an action by the minority to restrain the defen-
dants from further use of the premises, the lower court made ex-
tensive finding of fact as to the activities of the two factions follow-
ing the schism. On appeal, the supreme court stressed that whereas 
the plaintiffs continued to use Convention Sunday School litera-
ture and continued to participate in the Convention program, the 
defendants changed the literature in use, withdrew financial sup-
port from Convention activities, discharged officers and teachers 
opposing the original resolution, and resolved to continue inde-
pendently of the Convention. Consequently, the court affirmed 
a decree awarding the control of the church property to the plain-
tiffs as the "true congregation." This term was defined as includ-
ing all those ". . . who adhere and submit to the characteristic 
18 See, e.g., Mt. Zion Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa 138, 49 N.W. 81 (1891), where the 
majority was prevented from advancing the doctrine of "sinless perfection" in a Baptist 
church. The court was aided by a decision of an advisory council of ministers, which the 
divided church had called but whose findings it rejected, to the effect that the doctrine was 
not in harmony with Baptist teaching. 
10 A suggested rationale of the implied trust theory is that the power of the majority 
to govern is derivative, its source being the original organization; this power therefore 
remains limited by the faith and covenants originally adopted. Mt. Zion Church v. 
Whitmore, 83 Iowa 138 at 148-149, 49 N.W. 81 (1891). 
20 An extended discussion of the implied trust theory is found in Zou.MAN, AMERICAN 
CHURCH LAw, c. 7 (1933). See also 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSfEES §400 (1935). 
21 Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E. (2d) 114 (1954). 
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doctrines, usages, customs and practices of this particular church, 
recognized and accepted by both factions of the congregation be-
fore the dissension between them arose. "22 
The language used by this and other courts indicates that inter-
vention will follow only in cases of radical or fundamental 
changes.23 But these terms can be quite elastic, and a court's opin-
ion of what changes are fundamental will not necessarily coincide 
with that of the church members involved in a dispute. In a recent 
Missouri case,24 for example, the minority sought to exclude the 
majority from using the church premises because of an alleged 
departure from the doctrinal teachings of the church. The court 
in the ensuing litigation compared the "Common Confession" of 
the Missouri Synod, approved by the majority, with ~orresponding 
portions of the Orthodox Lutheran Doctrine adhered to by the 
defendants. Upon concluding that the differences between the 
groups amounted to "nothing more than shades of opinion on the 
same doctrine or dogma ... "25 the court denied the minority's 
contention. By contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court26 enjoined a 
defendant group from further use of church premises upon find-
ing that by repudiating the practice of "conventionism" it had 
departed from the "doctrine, tenets, customs and traditions" of 
the local church.27 
Of the several grounds for intervention considered, this ap-
proach is the most questionable. Logically, it means that any 
change abrupt enough to raise a voice of protest could be frus-
trated by legal action. Certainly courts should leave congregations 
free to select their Sunday School literature at the pleasure of the 
majority.28 And unless the church has adopted special rules gov-
erning affiliation with denominational organizations, there seems 
to be no reason why action related to this matter should not be 
22 Id. at 125. 
23 Compare Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W. (2d) 361 (1943) (election of new 
trustees by group arising within congregation set aside because of doctrinal differences) 
with Kemp v. Lentz, (Ohio App. 1943) 68 N.E. (2d) 339 (withdrawal of support from 
denominational seminary held not a departure from the church creed). And see Holt v. 
Scott, 252 Ala. 579, 42 S. (2d) 258 (1949), where the court apparently agreed that majority 
rule does not apply if there has been a radical departure from accepted principles, but 
refused to intervene when the minority contended that the majority had departed from 
the "Articles of Faith," saying the matter was not one which a court should attempt to 
resolve. 
24 Mertz v. Schaeffer, (Mo. App. 1954) 271 S.W. (2d) 238. 
25 Id. at 242. 
26 Hughes v. Grossman, 166 Kan. 325, 201 P. (2d) 670 (1949). 
21 Id. at 332. 
28 In Whipple v. Fehsenfeld, 173 Kan. 427, 249 P. (2d) 638 (1952), a change in Sunday 
School literature was treated as a departure justifying court intervention. 
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within the authority of the majority.29 In any event, it is unde-
sirable to have the courts impose limitations upon congregational 
church government on the basis of a judicial determination of 
what is and what is not a fundamental change. 
C. Intervention to Prevent Irregular Procedure. A dispute as 
to whether the majority could change the affiliation of the church 
from one ecclesiastical organization to another was also recently 
before an Illinois court.30 In permitting the proposed change, the 
court illustrated yet another approach to settlement of church 
schisms; namely, that judicial inquiry is proper to determine 
whether the congregation has proceeded regularly and in accord-
ance with its own rules and by-laws. In the Illinois case, it had 
been alleged that those favoring the protested change had brought 
additional numbers into the church designedly for the purpose 
of passing the amendment required to change the church affilia-
tion. The regularity of the meeting in which the decisive vote 
was taken was also questioned. On review the court found that 
the increase in membership was explainable on other grounds and 
that the final meeting was proper. The decree as affirmed en-
joined the plaintiffs from interfering with the operation of the 
church as long as the congregation acted in conformity with its 
constitution.31 In addition to recognizing that the society was 
completely self-determining, the court stressed that the church's 
constitution provided for amendments to be made.32 This fact 
was undoubtedly essential to the holding and probably serves to 
distinguish the case from the othenvise similar North Carolina 
situation.33 
Another recent example of judicial intervention to review 
the regularity of church procedures is Trett v. Lambeth.,34 where 
a minority faction called a special meeting to organize itself and 
subsequently asserted possession of the church premises to the 
exclusion of the opposing group. The primary difference between 
29 Keith v. First Baptist Church, 243 Iowa 616, 50 N.W. (2d) 803 (1952). See also 
Manning v. Yeager, 203 Ala. 185, 82 S. 435 (1919). 
30 Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. (2d) 514, 123 N.E. (2d) 104 (1954). , 
31 Another stipulation was that the congregation could not breach state law. The well-
recognized proposition that civil authorities may interfere with church practices violating 
state or federal statutes is not treated separately in this comment. 
32 "Part and parcel of the congregation's compact was the right of a majority to amend 
the constitution and by-laws." Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. (2d) 514 at 524, 123 N.E. 
(2d) 104 (1954). 
33 Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E. (2d) 114 (1954), discussed above. The North 
Carolina court made no mention of the presence or absence of a similar provision. 
31 (Mo. App. 1946) 195 S.W. (2d) 524. 
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the groups concerned whether the congregation should retain its 
affiliation with the local, state, and Southern Missionary Baptist 
Conventions. The court regarded the issue in dispute as "ecclesi-
astical" and not the court's concern, but said " ... it is our duty to 
determine whether the meeting. . . was of sufficient legality under 
the doctrines, rules and practice of the Center Grove congregation 
to permit the chang[es made] .... "35 Ruling that the meeting of 
the minority was irregular, the court affirmed a decree enjoining 
defendants from interfering with the majority's use of the proper-
ty.36 
Because the action approved by the Illinois court was by the 
majority, and the action disapproved by the Missouri court was 
by the minority, the foregoing cases do not constitute direct au-
thority for the proposition that a court will overrule the decision 
of a majority if established procedure has been disregarded. But 
the cases illustrate that review of action alleged to be in violation 
of adopted rules will be granted by some courts, 37 and the Illinois 
decision strongly implies that irregular majority action would 
be set aside. More important, the cases manifest a refusal to place 
restrictions upon congregational action in the absence of limita-
tions which the group has adopted for itself. 
IV. Constitutional Implications 
It is clear that the guarantees of religious freedom found in 
the First Amendment38 are extended to cover state action by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Everson v. 
Board of Education 39 Justice Black for the majority said: 
"The broad meaning given the [First] Amendment ... has 
been accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an 
individual's religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth 
Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the 
First applicable to state action abridging religious freedom. 
35 Id. at 534. 
36 Accord, Epperson v. Meyers, (Fla. 1952) 58 S. (2d) 150; Sims v. Green, (D.C. Pa. 
'1947) 76 F. Supp. 669, affd. (3d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 1011; Yeary v. White, 268 Ky. 471, 
105 S.W. (2d) 609 (1937). 
37 But see Grantham v. Humphries, 185 Miss. 496, 188 S. 313 (1939), where a complaint 
was dismissed as involving an "ecclesiastical" matter even though irregular procedure had 
been alleged. 
38 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .•.. " U.S. 
CONST., amend. I. 
39 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947). 
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There is every reason to give the same application and broad 
interpretation to the 'establishment of religion' clause."40 
That the function of state courts and judicial officers is to be 
regarded as state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was forcefully affirmed in Shelley v. Kraemer.41 
Together these Supreme Court decisions point up the fact 
that the propriety of judicial intervention in church affairs is not 
to be tested by state constitutional provisions regarding religious 
freedom and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
alone. One must also consider whether the interference constitutes 
the establishment of religion or prohibits its free exercise.42 
Until the Supreme Court reviews instances of state judicial 
intervention in the affairs of independent church bodies and inter-
prets the limitations required by the First Amendment, the pro-
priety of such intervention is open to some speculation. At the 
outset it might be observed that those ascribing to the "wall of 
separation" concept, espoused by Justice Black in the Everson 
case,43 should, if the metaphor is to be applied as a doctrine, treat 
all judicial intervention as a breach in the wall. However, the 
practical effect of such a policy would not always serve the cause 
of religious freedom. Religious rights do not necessarily thrive 
by being walled off. That the protection of temporal rights is 
necessary to spiritual expression has been recognized by an au-
thority who generally favors a strong separation theory: 
"Both the separation and freedom clauses of the First A-
mendment require the avoidance of court intervention in ec-
clesiastical disputes. Intervention frequently is unavoidable, 
as where the ownership and control of property depends on 
the determination of an ecclesiastical dispute."44 
40 Id. at 15. See also McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948); 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). 
41 334 U.S. I, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). The case held that judicial enforcement of restric-
tive covenants preventing use of land by a particular race constituted state action in 
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For an example 
of court action violating religious freedom, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 
S.Ct. 900 (1940). 
42 Whether the phrases of the First Amendment referring separately to the non-estab-
lishment and the free exercise of religion should be treated as two distinct limitations, or 
whether they express primarily a unitary guarantee of separation of church and state is a 
·matter of some controversy. See, e.g., PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 118-124 (1953). 
43 "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall 
must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. • • ." 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I at 18, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1952). 
44 PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 256-257 (1953). 
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But to avoid excessive judicial interference, a civil court might 
extend relief in one situation and withhold it in another although 
property rights are at issue in both. For example, the enforce-
ment of express trusts is quite consistent with the guarantee of 
religious freedom even though it might require inquiry into theo-
logical questions. A policy of non-intervention in such cases would 
eliminate the trust device as a means of furthering religious pur-
poses. Also, the settlement of disputes with inquiry limited to 
whether adopted rules of procedure have been followed is both 
defensible and desirable. The holding of church property by an 
independent congregation would be most precarious if the society 
could not resort to judicial redress should its own rules as to the 
control and disposition of the property be violated. However, 
for a court to enforce an implied trust, both defining its terms and 
deciding whether it has been violated, can impose severe limita-
tions upon the autonomy of the society. This is ~ven more true 
where congregational action is set aside on the ground of a doc-
trinal departure or a deviation from customs, usages, and traditions. 
Considerations such as these should assist in drawing the line be-
tween constitutional and unconstitutional judicial intervention. 
V. Conclusions 
By choosing a form of government which leaves the congrega-
tion free of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, independent churches in-
cur some hazards. The influence of the pastor, an influx of a 
new element in the membership, apathy of some until decisions 
are made - causes such as these may result in precipitate action 
or other consequences objectionable to some members. But it 
would seem far better to leave these problems in the hands of the 
congregation than for the civil courts to convert themselves into 
ecclesiastical tribunals whenever a faction feels aggrieved. 
Much litigation could be avoided if internal rules of organiza-
tion were formulated in anticipation of problems which arise in 
congregationally controlled churches. One very desirable effect 
of a policy limiting judicial inquiry to whether prescribed rules 
have been followed would be to encourage religious groups to 
formalize their procedures and to define clearly the extent of the 
majority's authority.45 Court action limited to the enforcement 
45 Such clarification is aided by state laws providing for ecclesiastical corporations. For 
example, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.182 provides that the articles of incorporation may 
be amended by a majority vote unless the church rules stipulate otherwise and provided 
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of express trusts and to the prevention of irregular procedure 
appears the most consistent with the principles of non-establish-
ment and free exercise of religion. 
Julius B. Poppinga, S.Ed. 
that the polity of the denomination does not require action by a superior church body. 
Under the special sections providing separately for the incorporation of churches belonging 
to some of the leading denominations, other amendment procedures are specified. See 
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §458.21 et seq. 
